Political deal in Ivato : polling dates issued for virtual institutions

During his holiday time, Rajoelina emphatically confirmed his opposition to any extension of the Transition beyond 2010, whatever its shape. No matter his insistence, his speech proved to be everything but a law. Iavoloha’s tenant put an umpteenth condition forth prior to tackle this “presidential dialog” with political parties. Electoral dates have to be jointly decided prior to addressing the crisis’ settlement process. Andry Rajoelina was expecting a wee bit more consensual looking roadmap to grant legitimacy to a new Republic built on sand.

The dictating authorities’ leader partly got what he wanted. Dates have been decided, but nothing is yet to be held for granted. Since these ones are way beyond 2010, Andry Rajoelina’s credibility is brought down once again, as he repeatedly nearly swore to God that his HAT would not live longer than 18months. The “Transition” is bound to last over the basically planned 24 months when the ruling authority was only a militarily supported putsch making band of renegades back in 2009. May 04th 2011 for the presidential race’s first round and June 1st 2011 for its second one happen to be a poisoned gift granted to an authority dying for gaining legitimacy though polls.

Deciding these deadlines long before the legal definition of the new Republic was a blunder committed by politicians gathered around the Rajoelina sphere. The HAT is doing away with the future institutions and bases the incoming elections on its exclusive laws. Foretelling that these elections would be as compulsory as predictable is allowed. The Constitutional Advisory Committee’s action didn’t influence the political evolution. Only November 17th 2010 as the constitutional referenddum’s deadline is Ivato’s meeting’s confirmed done deal. March 16th ‘s legislative elections are remaining virtual.

For being stranded on top of a sinking boat’s deck, Andry Rajoelina’s wanted polling deadlines are resulting from a desperate quest for an emergency exit. Although, according to the deal, he agreed on sharing power with half of the country’s political parties, in thorough opposition with his previous stand of few days earlier. The HAT consequently resorts to the verbal variations to avoid the complete shame: it would in no way be a new transition, but merely the enhanced shape of the current one. As a proof, Andry Rajoelina keeps in control, and becomes Transitional President, in remembrance of the Maputo charter. Ivato’s deal literally loots the agreements previously signed by the four sphere leaders, and patches up a new version of them without three of these spheres. Transitional institutions would be remaining the same ones: a Superior Transitional Council or the current but extended HAT would make the Upper Chamber; a Transitional Congress would remake the stillborn national unity government. The rule is simple: parties are proposing, Andry Rajoelina is consenting, or not.