The Ravalomanana case: parallel and contradictory interpretations

The agreement between the four mobility chiefs is only an agreement of principle on the Ravalomanana case. These present themselves as « determined in a reconciliation mindset », putting the nation’s interest above individual interests. « We… +are asking for+ the cancellation of M. Ravalomanana’s condemnations in regard of the conditions in which the suit took place « , could be read in agreement N°2. 

The second agreement’s article 2, concerning president Marc Ravalomanana’s case is in no way clearer. « The political mobility leaders are asking for the cancellation of the on-going pursuits « …, Does this required immediate release only concern the elected president or the further quoted people as well, that is to say political prisoners linked to the events of 2009? 

The condemnation of M. Ravalomanana is relative to a fact going back to 2008, logically classified las a judicial condemnation of political nature disguised in a common infringement. This description appears in the agreement N°3 on the cancellation of pursuits and condemnations during the Ravalomanana regime. 

It is stipulated that the elected president has been condemned during his mandate which stretches from 2002 to August 2009. This controversy on dates means that the concerned man has always been being, as he used to tell it out, the elected president of Madagascar, even though Rajoelina’s de facto transition has been instituted. 

Then, no one understands any more why do the four mobility chiefs ask the cancellation  of Ravalomanana’s condemnation, since in another agreement, they declare that all « political condemnations » which have occurred between December 2002 and August 2009 are from now on meaningless.  

In order to get Marc Ravalomana stranded, though he is no more president from the day of signature in Maputo, the HAT stands by a condemnation for facts that have occurred after August 2009. Could the pursuit cancellation required by the mobility chiefs in the agreement N°2 concern the outgoing president or only the political prisoners who happen to be his partisans? 

The file of February 07th’s slaughter remains the ultimate card up the Rajoelina mobility’s sleeve, if it is still keen on hindering Marc Ravalomanana from coming back to the country, even more from participating in the presidential election as he intends to. Members of the Transition’s government are insisting on the fact that future condemnations are waiting for the one that they ousted in latest March. 

Should Marc Ravalomanana be judged responsible for the tragic loss of life provoked by shootings on a hostile crowd attempting to raid the presidential palace, he might not benefit from the amnesty. Although, the amnesty will depend of a law voted by the Transition’s parliament’s convention, a lower chamber potentially favourable to the outgoing president. The Rajoelina mobility will therefore have to fight hard to deny the majority to the former parliamentarians TIM. If they succeed into that, some will have interest to prevent the institution of an appropriate political climate for M. Ravalomanana’s return home.