Is France remote-controlling the Malagasy crisis?

The facts

On June 10, 2002, out-going President Didier Ratsiraka, and President-elect Marc Ravalomanana were supposed to meet in Dakar for the second time. The meeting never did take place. The long-awaited agreement was not signed, and yet the game is over: Ratsiraka will voluntarily go into exile, and Ravalomanana will accept the inclusion of outside forces within a so-called “reconciliation” administration. On June 13, 2002, while he still proclaims his willingness to fight back, Ratsiraka flies off to Paris aboard an aircraft chartered by the French authorities. When questioned about the delay, given that this aircraft had already been waiting for two days, Ratsiraka explained that it was done to avoid the unnecessary expense of an extraneous round-trip. These words confirm a certain degree of intent, and premeditation on the part of the French authorities with regards to the evacuation of the out-going head of state, and his family, who have been issued long-term visas, despite the fact that the present Administration, and the Malagasy people consider them terrorists. From then on, all pro-Ratsiraka activities, in the provinces, immediately stop, as the pro-secession governors choose to flee, thereby freeing a population still reeling from a terrifying ordeal. Whether or not the entire crisis could have been artificially orchestrated, we may never know. One thing is for certain, it left thousands of innocent victims in its wake.

Two days later, on June 16, 2002, Marc Ravalomanana dissolves his administration, only to turn around and re-appoint Prime Minister Jacques Sylla, whom he puts in charge of creating a new government designed to reconcile and re-unify his divided nation. One fourth of this new administrative body will have close ties to the former President. There is even talk of granting amnesty to the out-going leader. It would be safe to assume that Marc Ravalomanana would not have acted this way, unless he was under a tremendous pressure. As a matter of fact, the Central Committee of OAU is scheduled to meet on June 21, 2002 in Addis-Abeba to discuss how to resolve the Malagasy crisis. We can assume, through statements made by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, that an official acknowledgement of Marc Ravalomanana as the Island’s leader is forthcoming. During a meeting with US President George W. Bush, at the White House, on Tuesday, he (Wade) predicted that the Malagasy situation will return to normal within the next few days. It makes one wonder where exactly the real power of OAU’s big wigs lie. Is it only to ratify? Or can they actually to lift the embargo?

The embargo

Everything leads one to think that France has been “remote-controlling” the crisis, and most particularly the embargo, right from the onset; as she has always done in the past in other former French colonies. As a matter of fact, the so-called ethnic civil war is nothing more than a minor flare-up designed to justify anti-economic measures, such as barricades, locally, and even internationally. The first measure came from pro-Ratsiraka supporters who decided to ground an aircraft leased by Air Madagascar, for security reason. It is interesting to note that Quai d’Orsay would make the very same claim when trying to talk Air France, Air Austral, and Corsair into discontinuing flights to and from the Island. And as Marc Ravalomanana underlined when he returned from the last Dakar Summit, all Malagasy public assets held overseas are still frozen, up to now.

One of the toughest hurdles that the new government has to overcome is a way to lift this embargo. Air Madagascar found another aircraft to lease. Marc Ravalomanana managed to provide the country with much needed fuel from the liberated ports. However, even if he has home field advantage just about everywhere in Madagascar, his credentials have yet to give him enough clout to become a major player in the eyes of the outside world. It is only thanks to mounting criticisms, coupled with Switzerland, Norway, and mainly USA’s political endorsement that Marc Ravalomanana can afford to make France pay some attention, to the will of the Malagasy People.

Communication War

Aside from the direct or indirect threats and pressures, the new President also has to overcome a misinformation propaganda war. The major wire services, notably AFP and Reuters regularly publish dispatches criticizing the new President or his administration. However, they rarely do anything about the former President’s actions. For example, on June 19, the news agencies openly criticized President Ravalomanana over the fact that AREMA, the former President’s party, is underrepresented in the new administration. At the same time, these same news agencies failed to report the abduction of several pro-Ravalomanana supporters in the province of Toamasina.

Prior to each important decision, AFP publishes the outcomes expected by the French Authorities. This week, for example, wire dispatches indicated that Marc Ravalomanana has agreed to grant amnesty to Ratsiraka, while according to sources close to the President, they are only studying a proposal which emanated from Quai d’Orsay.

France’s motives

If France’s role and strategy are clear with regards to the Malagasy crisis, her motives are equally so. Madagascar is among the poorest countries in the world. However, it is an important French-speaking stronghold where France is still all powerful. Up to now, every single minister has a French adviser. All official documents are available in French. It was even amazing when President Marc Ravalomanana opted to use an interpreter when he decided to address the French press. Colonial holdings which were nationalized during the 70’s are now privately owned and sold to French companies. In a nut shell, Madagascar and France are tied in very important ways.

Madagascar also remains an important pawn at the regional and African level. A speedy resolution of the crisis could have given ideas to all those African countries who would love to do the same. This may also explain why the international diplomatic community, and huge French conglomerates, such as the Bolloré Group, who owns quite a few subsidiaries in Africa, have been dragging their feet about a resolution. French conglomerates control more than two thirds of all foreign holdings in Madagascar, notably in key sectors such as telecommunication, water, electricity, and transportation industries. One suspects, through current dealings, that the money earned in Africa by some French enterprises is enough to sustain the slush fund coffers of French political parties.

Terrorism

The President’s secret service security detail is an elite army unit trained in France. Among other things, this security detail allowed Ratsiraka to keep the pressure in the provinces.

This week, the Tanzanian security service intercepted an aircraft transporting French mercenaries who were illegally on their way to Madagascar. The wire agencies, most particularly, AFP rushed to publish pieces blaming Ratsiraka for the incident. At the same time, Quai d’Orsay rushed to dispatch a team to Dar Es Salam to arrest the perpetrators. Was the fuss truly genuine, or was it just a smoke screen? Many skeptics have lodged a complaint, denouncing the logistical, and financial support given by France to the terrorists of this crisis.

Although France has hidden herself behind OAU, she has a very clear motive to stop Madagascar’s third “liberation” attempt in 32 years (1970, 1991, 2002). She also has the opportunity, and does not lack the means. Under those circumstances, why in the world should she mind?

Translated by Jeanne F. Razanamiadana